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ARTH R J. HuGHEs, Ph.B., 1911, LL.B., 1917, University of Notre
Dame. Past President of the National Notre Dame Alumni Association;
President of the Chicago Chapter of the National Catholic Alumni Federation; National President of the National Catholic Alumni Federation.
Engaged in the general practice of law in Chicago, Illinois, for twentyone years; since 1930, as head of own law firm.
WILLIAm STERNBERG, A.B., 1907, LL.B., 1910, Creighton University.
Author of The Element of Hostility in Adverse Possession (1932) 6
TEmPLE L. QuAR. 207; Nature of Possibilities of Reverter (1931) 6
NoTRE DAME LAWY. 442; Contingent Remainders (1933) 8 NOTRE
DAmE LAWy. 320; Diversity Jurisdiction (1935) 10 NOTRE DAmE
LAwy. 219. Professor of Law, Creighton University.

MAURICE M. TULCHINSKY, A.B., 1936, LL.B., 1937, University of
Notre Dame. Practicing law at South Bend, Indiana.

NOTES
BILLS AND NOTES-INCORPORATING COLLATERAL SECURITY-EpFECT ON NEGOTIABILITY.--One of the most confusing and obscure doc-

trines in the law of Bills and Notes is the rule governing collateral
agreements, more specifically, those instruments, such as mortgages and
deeds of trust, given as security for a note. An investigation into some
decisions rendered within the last decade or so bears out the significance of the problem. It is held quite generally that a mere reference
to the collateral security will not be sufficient to incorporate the terms
of the agreement into the note.' Thus where a note recites that it is
"secured by a mortgage," this is a mere reference not sufficient to incorporate the mortgage into the negotiable instrument. 2 In Magee v. First
Nat. Bank of Ellwortk 3 the court said: "The appellant contends that
the recital that the note is secured by a mortgage destroys its negotia1 Ashland Building & Loan v. Kerman, 155 N. E. 245 (Ohio, 1926); Walter
v. Kilpatrick, 132 S. E. 148 (N. C. 1926); Christian Community of Universal
Brotherhood v. Graf, 1 Pac. (2d) 596 (Ore. 1931); Cook v. Parks, 169 S. E.
208 (Ga. 1933).
2 Magee v. First Nat. Bank of Ellworth, 232 N. W. 336 (Minn. 1930); Willianison v. Craig, 215 N. W. 664 (Iowa, 1927).

8 Op. cit. supra note 2.
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bility. This recital in no way incorporates into the note the provisions of
the mortgage, or any part thereof. Nothing is thereby added to the
contract."
The question then arises as to what is necessary to incorporate a
collateral agreement into a note. It has been held that even though the
note and the collateral agreement be written on the same paper, the
note will not incorporate the agreement. 4 In Williams v. Silverstein 5
the court said: "But even though the agreement be written upon the
same paper that the note is written on, where it is evident that it was
not intended to incorporate the terms of the agreement within the note
itself, the transferability and negotiability of the note will not be affected by the agreement." Likewise, it has been held that even though
the conditional sales agreement and the note referred to each other the
note remains unaffected. 6
On the other band, it was held in Von Nordheim v. Cornelius 7 that
where the conditional sales contract and note were on the same paper
that the two constituted one instrument; therefore, the plaintiff, cutting the note from the agreement, was not a holder without knowledge
and that as to him the note was non-negotiable. The court said: "It
has long been the rule in this jurisdiction that, although a note otherwise negotiable is not rendered non-negotiable merely by reference to
collateral security, a note and a mortgage executed at the same time
as part of one transaction are to be construed as one instrument, and
terms in the mortgage may render the note non-negotiable as to all
with notice thereof." Did not the court here confuse negotiability with
holding in due course?
The courts have differed somewhat upon what words will be sufficient to incorporate the instrument into the note. Generally, the courts
have held that if the note merely recites that it is "subject to the terms
of the mortgage" the note remains unimpaired. 8 In order then to incorporate an instrument into the note it is necessary that the words
expressly state that it is subject to all the terms of the collateral instrument, just as though the provisions were expressly recited therein.
This is best illustrated by the decision in the Merchants' National
Bank v. Detroit Trust Co., 9 in which the court dealt with both types
of negotiable instruments. It held that the bonds were negotiable where
the provision stated: "This bond is entitled to the benefits and subject to the provisions of an indenture of mortgage ... to which mort4

Williams v. Silverstein, 2 Pac. (2d) 165 (Cal. 1931).

5 Op. cit. supra note 4.
6

Commercial Credit Co. v. Parks, 112 So. 237 (Ala. 1927).

7 262 N. W. 832 (Neb. 1935).
8 Merchants' National Bank v. Detroit Trust Co., 242 N. W. 739 (Mich.
1932); Ferring v. Verwey, 229 N. W. 46 (Wis. 1930).

9 Op. cit. supra note 8.
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gage reference is hereby made. . . ." But the Court held another set
of bonds nonnegotiable because of the following provisions: "This
bond and the coupons thereto attached are expressly made subject to
and shall be bound by all of the provisions in the said mortgage or
deed of trust contained, the same as though all of said provisions were
herein expressly set forth and the holder hereof expressly acknowledges notice of all such provisions."
The next point to be considered is, What effect does the incorporation have upon the negotiability? It has been held that negotiability
is not destroyed by the incorporation of the collateral security in the
note, unless the provisions of that security are contrary to the Negotiable Instruments Law.10 The law is well-stated in Old Colony Trust
Co. v. Stumpel, n where the court said: "The note thus being made
expressly subject to the terms of the conditional sales agreement, that
agreement, incorporated therein, must be examined to ascertain if any
of its provisions impair negotiability."
In other cases it has been held that incorporation is immaterial,
unless the words of incorporation are such as to indicate that payment
of the instrument is to 12be burdened with provisions or conditions of
the extrinsic agreement.
The weight of authority seems to hold, however, that, if the reference is such that it incorporates all the terms of the collateral security,
the negotiability is destroyed regardless of what the provisions in the
extrinsic instrument are.18 In Enoch v. Brandon14 the court explained:
"If in the bond or note, anything appears requiring reference to another document to determine whether in fact the unconditional promise to pay a fixed sum at a future date is modified or subject to some
contingencjr, then the promise is no longer unconditional. What that
document may provide is immaterial. Reference to the paper itself said
to be negotiable determines its character."
Carl Doozan.

10 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Stumpel, 213 N. Y. S. 536 (1926), affirmed, 220
N. Y. S. 893, 161 N. E. 173 (1928); Pollard v. Tobin, 247 N. W. 453 (Wis.
1933); Marine National Exchange Bank of Milwaukee v. Kalt-Zimmers' Mfg.
Co., 79 L. ed. 427 (1936).
11 Op. cit. supra note 10.
12 Gerrish v. Atlantic Ice & Coal Co., 80 Fed. (2d) 648 (D. C., N. D. Ga.

1935).
1s Pflueger v. Broadway Trust & Savings Bank, 184 N. E. 318 (Ill. 1933);
Sturgis National Bank v. Harris Trust & Savings Bank, 184 N. E. 589 (JI. 1933);
Enoch v. Brandon, 164 N. E. 45 (N. Y. 1928); Shushan v. Trepagneir, 175 So.
651 (La. 1937); Musto v. Grosjian, 281 Pac. 1022 (Cal. 1929).

14 Op. cit. supra note 13.
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DAMAGES-RECOVERY FOR WORDS NEGLIGENTLY OR INTENTIONALLY SAID IN REGARD TO THIRD PERSON CAUSING THE PLAINTIFF EMOTIONAL DISTURBANCE-FEAR OF PERSONAL INJURY TO THIRD PERSON.

-The general rule is that every negligent act that results in damage
to someone is not actionable.' In the recent case of Curry v. Journal
Publishing Co. 2 the court held that a reader, the reader's wife, and
their subsequently born child, could not recover in damages because
of injuries caused by shock and grief at reading in the defendant's
paper of the death of the reader's father. The newspaper owed no
duty to the reader where the injuries alleged were so serious and unusual as not to be foreseeable by the publisher. The decision in the
case of Herrick v. Evening Express Publishing Co. 3 is in accord with
the decision in the Curry case. The court in the latter case held that
the mother of a boy in the army could not recover for injuries caused
by grief and shock from reading in the newspaper of his supposed
death. In these cases we see that there was no injury to the third person, and the words in each case were not spoken and written negligently.
In the case of Bielitski v. Obadiak 4 the words spoken were spoken intentionally. The plaintiff, in this case, was allowed to recover damages
by the reason of the fact that the defendant had told the story that
the husband of the plaintiff had committed suicide by hanging himself. The majority of the court held that the defendant was liable upon the theory that the injury was the proximate result of the wilful,
false report originated and circulated by him with the intent that it
should be communicated to her.
Generally the rule has been that there can be no recovery for the
physical consequences of fright caused by another's peril, which is
the result of the negligence of a third person. The law seems to be that
there can be no recovery for injuries resulting wholly from mental
shock or fright not accompanied by any physical injury. Even the
courts that hold that a physical impact isn't necessary to the recovery
for fright have held that recovery is denied in the case of fear at another's peril.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has held that recovery may be had
in a proper case solely for the physical consequences of the fright,
without physical injury from impact; but that there can be no recovery
for the consequences of physical shock caused by fright at the peril
of another person, resulting from the negligence of a third person. In
Waube v. Warrington5 the authorities are reviewed and the Wisconsin
court concludes that where a mother witnesses the negligent killing
1 Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248
1253 (1928).
2 68 Pac. (2d) 168 (1937).
3 120 Me. 138, 113 Atd. 16, 23 A. L.
4 15 Sask. Law Rep. 156, 65 D. L. R.
5 216 Wis. 603, 258 N. W. 497, 98 A. L.

N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99, 59 A. L. R.

R. 358 (1921).
627, 23 A. L. R. 351 (1922).
R. 394 (1935).
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of her child she cannot recover for the physical injuries caused by
the shock. The court held that the problem must be approached from
the viewpoint of duty of the defendant and the right of the plaintiff
and not from the viewpoint of proximate cause, saying: "That the
right of the mother to recover must be based, first, upon the establishment of a duty on the part of the defendant so as to conduct herself
with respect to the child as not to subject the mother to an unreasonable risk of shock or fright, and, second, upon the recognition of a
legally protected right or interest on the part of the mother to be free
from shock or fright occasioned by the peril of her child." The Court
said that it was not enough to find a breach of duty to the child, and
allow the consequence of such a breach to go as far as the law of
proximate cause will permit them to go, and then sustain a recovery
by the mother, if a physical injury to her by reason of shock or fright
is held not too remote.
The two leading cases that uphold recovery in the case of fear of
the peril of another are Hambrook v. Stokes 6 and Spearman v. McCrary.7 In the latter case the mother recovered damages for fright
when she saw her two children placed in peril by the negligence of
the defendant. The court in adopting the view that recovery could be
had for shock or fright culminating in physical injurr although there
was no physical impact, approached the case from the standpoint of
proximate cause. The Hambrook case was one where recovery was had
although there was no physical impact; fright and fear for the safety
caused the injuries to the mother in the case. The trial court directed
the jury that if the nervous shock was caused by fear of her child's
safety, as distinguished from her own, plaintiff could not recover.
From a verdict for the defendants, the plaintiff appealed and the trial
court was reversed and recovery was had. Viewing the matter from the
standpoint of proximate cauge, the court held that there could be no
distinction between the shock suffered as a result of fear for her own
safety and the fear for the safety of her children. While the majority
of the court took this view of the case, the dissenting opinion of Sargant, L. J., approached it from the standpoint of duty. The dissenting
opinion concedes that since it was the duty of the driver to use due
care in the management of the vehicle to avoid injury to those on or
near the highway, the duty cannot be limited to physical injuries
caused by actual physical impact; but the dissenting opinion further
states that there is a difference where the shock to the plaintiff is due,
not to fear for the plaintiff's safety but for the safety of another. The
dissenting opinion states that "it would be a considerable and unwarranted extension of the duty of owners of vehicles towards others in or
near the highway, if it were held to include an obligation not to do
6 [1925J 1 K. B. 141.
7 4 Ala. App. 473, 58 So. 927 (1912).

